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ABSTRACT 
Water has vital importance in all aspects of human life. It is a key natural resource for any country. 
The demand for water is increasing due to population growth and poor water management. Many 
countries meet the demand for water by building reservoirs for water storage. The construction of 
reservoirs however, may provoke conflicts over water resources between the government and other 
involved stakeholders in these projects. Moreover, these water conflicts may escalate further if the 
stakeholders already have a history of conflict on the distribution of other available resources. 
This is a study of politics of water resource management. Empirically, the study focuses on the 
conflict over the Kalabagh Dam project in Pakistan. The purpose of the study is to explore why 
there is a continuous conflict between the concerned provinces over the construction of the KBD 
project. There is a considerable resistance against this project in the smaller provinces despite the 
increasing demand of water and electricity in the country. The study analyzes that the disputes over 
the allocation of water from other available resources, distribution of National Finance Commission 
Awards and resettlement of displaced people from Tarbela Dam Project in the past have further 
aggravated the KBD conflict. Moreover, ethno-regional politics is hindering the process of 
communication and a cause of diminishing trust among stakeholders. There is a need to reactivate 
the Council of Common Interests and improve the functioning of Indus River System Authority in 
order to manage the KBD conflict. 
 Keywords:  Kalabagh project, Provincial disputes, Federal government, Hydro politics 
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1. Introduction 
1.0.Introduction 
Water has vital importance in all aspects of human life. It is a key natural resource for any country. 
The demand for water is increasing due to population growth and poor water management (UN 
Water Development Report, 2009). All countries meet the demand for water by building reservoirs 
for water storage. The construction of reservoirs however, may provoke conflict over water 
resources between the government and other involved stakeholders in these projects. 
Natural resources are not the only reason for the emergence of conflict. As Collier (2007) described, 
natural resources are not the sole source of conflict and they do not make conflict inevitable. There 
may be other factors that can contribute to any particular conflict situation. For example, feelings of 
ethnic and political marginalization in any particular community may evolve a new conflict 
orescalate the on-going conflict over the natural resources of that area. 
Many countries in the world are involved in water conflicts. More than 50 countries in five 
continents might soon be caught up in water disputes unless they move quickly to establish 
agreements on how to share reservoirs and rivers (Yaldram, 2009). Water disputes between states 
bring regional tensions, delay economic development and activate the risks of causing more 
conflicts. Many scholars believe that intensified water scarcity will bring people to fight over their 
resources. Water as a renewable resource will be a major source of conflict in 21st century (Marquet, 
2011). 
 
South Asia is one of the regions where water conflicts between and inside the nations are at its peak. 
During the British colonization of the area, there were water disputes among and between provinces 
and the princely states. The partitioning of the country (into what are now India, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh) resulted in redrawing of the political boundaries, giving rise to new disputes over water 
rights. Pakistan and India have been involved in a water conflict over the Indus basin since the end 
of British colonization of the Indo-Pak (Verghese, 1997).  
According to Elhance (1997) hydro politics is a systematic study of conflict and cooperation 
between actors over water resources. The hydro politics can be observed between states that 
transcend national borders or among inter-states of a country. Hydro politics surrounding the 
Kalabagh dam project (KBD) is an example of hydro politics among intra-state actors. 
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The Indus River became Pakistani territory after the Indus Water Treaty which was established 
between India and Pakistan in 1960.It is the major source of water in Pakistan. The Indus River, 
with its tributaries, creates one of the largest water systems in the world. Its length is 2900 
kilometers and it stretches from Himalayas to Arabian Sea. Major water reservoirs that have been 
built on Indus River are the Terbela and the Chasma (Ahmad, 1995). 
The KBD project is a hydroelectric project, proposed by the government of Pakistan, which has been planned 
to be built on the Indus River. The Kalabagh consultants
1
were appointed in 1982, to produce the fully 
developed project proposals on the KBD (WAPDA Project Planning Report, 2007). The project 
team was asked to complete the detailed design and contract documents in preparation for the 
implementation stage. This project was supposed to be implemented with assistance from the 
United Nations Development Program, supervised by the World Bank, for the client Water and 
Power Development Authority of Pakistan (ibid.).When the proposal was published, different 
provincial governments started to oppose the project. In this way, the KBD Project has aroused 
controversy between different provincial governments and the federal government of Pakistan from 
the start and still no consensus has been reached for this proposed project. 
1.1. Problem statement 
The economy of Pakistan mainly depends on agriculture. It employs more than 45 percent of total 
work force. About 70 percent population lives in rural areas of the country. Pakistan is blessed with 
adequate surface and ground water resources. These resources are major input for the agriculture of 
the country. . However, increase in urbanization, population and mismanagement has created high 
stress on available water resources. Currently, the country is facing water crisis owing to the huge 
gap between demand and supply of water. Moreover, the country mostly depends on hydro-power 
to produce cheap electricity. So, the less availability of water for the production of electricity has 
also given rise to electricity crisis. But the proposed solutions for these problems are not without 
controversy (PILDAT, 2011:9). 
The KBD project was one of the solutions to get out of these problems but the solution itself has 
become a problem. This project has become politicized and also has generated inter-provincial 
conflict. According to Kaiser Bengali (2003) water scarcity is not just an issue of natural scarcity. It 
is socially generated scarcity as well. It is also the result of bad management policies. Despite of its 
                                                          
1
A joint venture of five engineering firms, Binnie & Partners of UK, Harza Engineering Co. of USA, Mott Ewbank Preece 
Ltd. of UK, Associated Consulting Engineers & NESPAK of Pakistan  
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critical importance in Pakistan, political management of water resources like the KBD project has 
failed in the country. 
So, it is very important to analyze the facts and responsible factors of provincial hydro-politics 
without any bias. If the differences between different stakeholders are not settled then ongoing 
water and power crisis in Pakistan will be further aggravated. 
What intrigues me is to find out why Pakistan has been unable to move forward towards the 
construction of this project despite a dire need of new water resources in the country. 
1.2.Research questions 
The purpose of the study is to explore why there is a continuous conflict between the concerned 
provinces over the construction of the KBD project and how this conflict is articulated. Precisely, it 
seeks to answer the following questions; 
I. What are the major interests and concerns of the different stakeholders of this project? 
II. Which institutions are responsible for assessing, negotiating and administering the 
management of the KBD project and how have they acted in the ongoing conflict between 
the federal and provincial levels and between the provinces? Which are the actual outcomes 
of the aforementioned conflicts? 
III. Is it possible to solve this conflict and, if that is the case, which measures ought to be taken 
so as to achieve this solution? 
 
1.3. Methods and methodology 
This study has been carried out by using a qualitative research method. Qualitative research method 
usually utilizes case studies, open ended survey responses, notes, photos and videos. They do not 
just rely on statistics or numbers, which is the sphere of quantitative researchers (Heath & Cowley, 
2004).  This study relies on secondary data collection and it has been done with the help of literature 
based on water conflicts and different reports, articles, documents and newspapers. 
At first different stakeholders and their sources of communication with each other are identified by 
reviewing articles of various authors on the KBD project. Secondly, official websites and annual 
reports of the different federal and provincial government departments like Ministry of Water and 
Power, National finance Commission, Ministry of law & human rights and Election Commission of 
Pakistan are consulted in order to get the view point of different stakeholders. Moreover, 
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newspapers like, The Dawn, The News International, and The Kawish are used to observe the level 
of tension between stakeholders and their attempts of participation. The selected newspapers are 
widely circulated and are very attentive to the social issues of Pakistan. The selected sources helped 
in many ways to create a better understanding regarding the relation and interaction among 
stakeholders of the KBD project. It has also given the view point of local   politicians and 
governmental institutions. In addition to this, relevant reports of various national and international 
organizations like Pakistan Engineering Congress, South Asia Water Forum, World Bank and UN 
annual reports have been studied in order to get a broader picture of the issue.  
After the selection of material, it was placed into thematic areas in line with the objectives of the 
study and then it was analyzed to provide answers to the research questions with the help of relevant 
articles and theories. Hallgren’s theory of social interaction (2003) was used to analyze the 
statements of different stakeholders and the nature of the KBD conflict. 
Moreover, a historical analysis has been performed. Historical analysis is the study of past events 
which is commonly used in social science research for establishing a background of the study and to 
inform the possible outcomes and answers to current events and questions (Martha & Walter, 2001). 
At first step, the case background was examined; later an overview of the major social, political, and 
historical events that contributed to the KBD conflict and lead the actors towards the current stand-
off position were identified and explained in the study. 
The Comparative case studies of an Indian hydro project (cross national comparison) and the 
Tarbela Dam Project in Pakistan are also included in the study to have a deep exploration of the 
KBD issue. Comparative case studies exemplifies the reason of  comparison which means that we 
can comprehend the society phenomenon in better ways when there is a comparison between two or 
more situations. The disadvantage of comparative cross-national method is that sometimes the 
researcher finds confronting situations while comparing the events of different countries with same 
parameters. The results of this comparison can be liked or disliked by these countries (Hantrias, 
1996). 
1.4. Limitations 
Lack of resources prevented me to travel into the three provinces to conduct interviews with all the 
stakeholders of the KBD project. Moreover, many explanatory letters were required from different 
agencies to conduct field work especially in two provinces, as the law and order situation was not 
satisfactory in these areas. Stakeholders also have hostile political relations so the officials of 
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provincial governments were not interested to share important information in order to avoid 
problematic disturbances. Although one of the major limitations of this research was non-
participation from different actors but efforts have been made to get pertinent and accurate 
information and view point of all the major stakeholders by using various online media sources. 
However, these kinds of sources are not always reliable and that they are biased, of course, by what 
each stakeholder wants to put forward as being the most relevant information. I also think that by 
conducting the field work and including a perspective focusing on local people’s views would have 
enriched the study. 
 
1.4. Thesis outline 
This first chapter of the study has given a brief introduction to water conflicts in South Asia and 
hydro politics over the KBD project. Moreover, this chapter defined the research problem, the 
methods of the study and the research question. 
Chapter two, “Theoretical Framework”, describes the theories of conflict over natural resources. A 
critical discussion of these concepts is made to have a deep understanding of the conflict. 
Chapter three of the study, “Background”, gives a historical overview of hydro politics over Indus 
basin between India and Pakistan. This chapter also describes the interprovincial water politics over 
the KBD project. 
Chapter four, “Stakeholders and their view point on the KBD project”, describes the different 
stakeholders of the KBD project. It also explains about the political and administrative structure of 
federal and provincial governments. Moreover, it illuminates the power struggle and water dispute 
management institutions among the stakeholders. Furthermore, it describes the objections of 
different provincial governments and the view point of Water and Power Development Authority 
(WAPDA) over the KBD project. 
Chapter five, “Analysis of Interprovincial Relations and their effect on the controversy of KBD 
project”, gives a detailed picture of interprovincial relations in Pakistan.  It also explains how the 
NFC Award controversy, ethnicity and the failure of water dispute resolution institutions affected 
the interprovincial relations and the KBD project. The case studies of the Tarbela Dam Project in 
Pakistan and Sardar Sarovar Project in India are being presented here in order to demonstrate the 
problematic side of other constructions of similar dam projects in the region. 
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Chapter six, “Conclusion”, concludes the study and provides future perspectives of the KBD 
project. 
2. Theoretical Framework 
Conflicts over natural resources are salient in contemporary world society and the issue has 
generated considerable interest within social sciences. Different views of various authors about the 
emergence and development of conflict are discussed in this chapter.  
Different authors develop the definition of conflict in a different way. Conflict is generally 
perceived as a matter of opposing interests. According to Danial and Walker (2001) emergence of 
conflict is due to the incompatibility of the desires and goals of the stakeholders of any issue. 
Conflicts get more complicated when many different parties start showing their interest in the same 
issue.  
According to Friedrich Glass (1999:16-19), when the interaction of differences, perceptions, 
feelings and will in another person’s behavior is perceived as restrictive then we call it a social 
conflict.  He also claimed that the existence of difference is not the problem, as differences in 
themselves do not constitute conflict between people. What is important is how people handle their 
differences and how they experience them. He believed that the major cause of conflict is difficulty 
in dealing with change. Further he emphasized the need to help the people by developing their 
social skills to make them enable to deal with conflict situations by themselves, as far as possible. 
He also emphasized the need to develop “conflict capable attitude” in people. Once people become 
more ‘conflict capable’ they can make the organizations in which they are involved more ‘conflict 
resistant’ (Ibid). 
Swain (2004) particularly talked about the emergence of conflict over water resources. He argued 
that difference in the perceptions of different stakeholders is the reason of this conflict. According 
to him, water resources can trigger conflicts between the state and its internal groups. The 
development of water resources by any state by building different kinds of infrastructure like dams, 
irrigation canals might be perceived by the local population against their interests. As a result, 
regional powers in that particular area (where new water resources are supposed to be built) may be 
activated and start challenging the actions of the state. 
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Adams et.al (2003:1916-17) described that conflict is often assumed to reflect differences in 
material interests between stakeholders. In such circumstances, conflict may be managed by 
attempting to reconcile multiple interests in resource management. But the origins of conflict may 
also go beyond material incompatibilities. They arise at a deeper cognitive level when stakeholders 
draw on their current knowledge and understanding to cognitively frame a specific natural resource 
management problem. Stakeholders often do not clearly recognize the ways in which their 
knowledge and understanding frame their perspectives on natural resource management. Hence, 
differences in knowledge, understanding and perceptions may provide a deeper explanation of 
conflict. It happens when different stakeholders make different interpretations of major issues of 
conflict. The knowledge which allows stakeholders to define the problems of resource use falls into 
three categories: knowledge of the empirical context; knowledge of laws and institutions; and 
beliefs, myths, and ideas. Stakeholders’ knowledge of the empirical context derives from various 
sources. At the local level, knowledge may derive from direct personal experience, particularly from 
catastrophes such as droughts or floods. At larger scales, knowledge may be driven from the 
insights of formal empirical and theoretical research by official agencies and research organizations 
using censuses, or sample surveys (Ibid). 
It can be concluded from the above discussion that these authors have a similar understanding of 
conflict, even though their emphases vary. Factors like incompatibility of interests, difference in 
perceptions and interpretations of other people’s actions can be noticed as similar factors in all of 
these theories.  
But according to Hallgren (2003:8) incompatibility in the interests of stakeholders is not solely 
responsible for a conflict. It is just a part of the picture. For example when two different actors make 
claims to a certain resource, it might have various outcomes depending on the interaction that takes 
place between them. It might result in a conflict or no conflict. Moreover, conflict might be solved 
out easily or it could escalate further. So, conflict is not only an outcome of opposing interest but 
social interaction is also a major factor. Therefore, it is essential to separate the two situations that 
“conflict is social interaction during which the actors trust to the interaction decreases” (Ibid). 
Furthermore, he distinguished the conflict from competition, interest divergence and goal 
differences. Conflict can be involved in the mentioned phenomenon, but conflict also adds a 
specific aspect to the situation. He argues that, misunderstanding in the process of communication 
leads toward misinterpretation of the actions of the other person. As a result, actors’ interest in the 
situation starts to decrease. This is the emergence of social conflict. 
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Hallgren and Ljung (2005) stated numerous signs which indicate that the actor’s trust in the 
interaction is decreasing during the communication process. The actors use various methods to 
change the situation like trying to withdraw from the interaction and communication process, 
different actors put more influence over the situation by preventing the other actors from having 
influence and they attempt to question credibility and legitimacy of each other. Furthermore, verbal 
attacks and physical violence can also be observed as a tool to change the situation. Thus, 
misinterpretations and misunderstandings are created among stakeholders and it becomes a cause of 
trust-diminishing interaction. 
Hallgren (2003) also explained constructive methods that can be used in order to increase the trust 
during the communication process if conflict is caused by distrust in the interactive situation. He 
argues that conflict intervention is a specific task in natural resources management and the agencies 
responsible ought to offer communicative facilitation and conflict intervention. He also suggested 
that when the actors of common issues have different interests but have appropriate trust to 
communicate with each other then we should try to understand the differences and opportunities for 
common interest. Furthermore, in order to increase the trust during communication process, it is 
necessary to Meta-communicate (or communication about communication) which means to talk 
about the pre-conditions for communicating and how the actors relate to each other. Usually this is 
not an easy thing to practice during conflict. It might be perceived by others as yet another strategy 
to manipulate the situation so it also requires that the individual overcomes some of his distrust by 
showing some courage and will power. Moreover, help from professional facilitators could also be 
sought in order to ensure full participation of stakeholders and keep participants on track towards 
the creation of opportunities to increase the actors’ trust in the process. 
3. Case Background 
3.1. The Indus Basin and its water disputes 
This section of the study describes the location of Indus Basin and the dispute over it between India 
and Pakistan after the end of British colonization in 1947. It also explains the Indus Water Treaty, 
which divided the Indus Basin water between India and Pakistan. 
The Indus Basin is the largest river basin in Asia with an approximate area of one million square 
kilometers. It is the major source of water in the region of India and Pakistan. It extends over four 
countries in South Asia including China in the north-east, India in the east, Afghanistan in the north-
west and the vast majority of the plains of the Punjab, the Sindh and the KPK (Khyber Pakhtukhwa) 
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province in Pakistan. Fifty six percent of the Indus Basin is located in Pakistan and covers 
approximately 70 percent of the country area (Rehman & Kamal, 2005).  
 
Figure1. The Indus Basin and its Major Water Resources 
Source: USIP special report on “Hydro politics in Pakistan’s Indus Basin”, 2010.Available at:  
http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR261%20-%20Hydropolitics_in_Pakistan's%20_Indus_Basin.pdf 
 
The Indus System of rivers is comprised of three western rivers, the Indus, the Jhelum, the Chenab 
and three further eastern rivers the Sutlej, the Beas and the Ravi. The major contributor to the 
annual water flow for these rivers is snowmelt, originating in the Hindukush-Himalayan region. All 
of the Indus Basin Rivers pass through India before flowing into Pakistan. 
 
The partition of India and Pakistan in 1947, created a conflict over the water share from Indus basin. 
The water of Indus River begins in the Himalayan state in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The 
ownership of this state is disputed between India and Pakistan since 1947. Because of the dispute 
over political land boundaries, land which included the Indus River, both countries had been 
involved in a conflict since the conclusion of the Indus Water Treaty (Ibid). 
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3.2. The Indus Water Treaty  
After the eight years of negotiations on Indus Basin water dispute, both the Governments of 
Pakistan and India came to an agreement and signed a water sharing treaty in 1960, named the Indus 
Water Treaty. It was signed with the help of the World Bank. This treaty divided the use of rivers 
between the two countries. Pakistan obtained exclusive rights for the three western rivers; the Indus, 
the Chenab and the Jehlum and India retained rights to the three eastern rivers; the Ravi, the Beas 
and the Sutluj (Ahmad, 2004). 
According to Mustafa (2010:4) “after the Indus Water Treaty, the World Bank started massive aid 
programs in India and Pakistan to build up the storage and conveyance facilities and provide 
remedial water supplies for the flows that were supposedly lost to the other country”. 
3.3. Major hydropower projects in Pakistan 
Most of Pakistan is situated in a dry region about fifty percent of the country is arid and forty 
percent is semi arid. Only ten percent of the country falls in humid category. The rainfall also varies 
from season to season and region to region. Agriculture is the backbone of the economy of Pakistan 
as 68 percent of the population of the country living in rural areas is directly or indirectly dependent 
on agriculture for their livelihood. Large part of the agriculture of the country depends on irrigation 
water which is supplied through the Indus River and its tributaries (Saleem, 2011). 
Pakistan has two major water reservoirs and many small water reservoirs located in the different 
provinces of the country. Major water reservoirs are the Mangla and the Tarbela dam. The Mangla 
dam is located on the Jhelum River in the Mirpur District of Azad Kashmir, Pakistan. It was built in 
1967 with funding from the World Bank (Myers, 1997). The Tarbela Dam is built on the Indus 
River. It is located in Haripur district in KPK province. The dam was completed in 1974 and was 
designed to store water from the Indus River for irrigation and hydroelectric power generation (Tate 
et.al, 2000). The reservoirs of the Mangla and the Tarbela play an important role in the economy of 
the country. Not only do they provide water for irrigation, but also help to generate cheap 
electricity. The Mangla and Tarbela reservoirs have power generating capacity of 1150 MW (mega 
watt) and 3500 MW, respectively. Since irrigation demand has the first priority on water released 
from the Tarbela and Mangla reservoirs, the production of energy from the power plants on these 
reservoirs occur either as a byproduct of irrigation water release or when surplus water for irrigation 
needs is available (ibid). 
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3.4. Water Distribution Accord  
Both reservoirs (the Mangla and the Tarbela) were causes of conflict after their construction among 
the provincial governments of Punjab, Sindh and KPK provinces. These provinces are the main 
users of the irrigation water for agriculture. The government of the Sindh province accused the 
provincial government of Punjab for stealing its water share from these reservoirs. But on the other 
hand, the provincial government of Punjab refused the allegations and claimed that it has been using 
less water than its requirement to accommodate the provincial government of Sindh and KPK. The 
construction of new water reservoirs in Pakistan almost stopped in 1977 due to the non-resolution of 
the interprovincial water sharing from the already existing reservoirs. The country underwent a one 
and a half decade long crisis related to irrigation supplies and hydropower generation before 
reaching a consensus in the 1991 Water Distribution Accord. An interprovincial agreement became 
essential to solve the long standing dispute of canal water uses, shares in the river supplies and 
surplus flows in the form of floods. In 1991, a water sharing agreement among four provinces of 
Pakistan (Sindh, Punjab, Balochistan and KPK) was made. This accord distributed the available 
water among the provinces and major share of water was given to the Punjab province. This accord 
protected the existing uses of canal water in each province and also apportioned the balance of river 
supplies, including flood surpluses and future storages among the provinces (Pakistan Water 
Accord, 1991)  
Table1. 
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Source: (Pakistan Water Accord, 1991 (Agreement), March 1991 and Water Accord1991, Section 6, 
[Online] Available at:http://www.cms.waterinfo.net.pk/pdf/wa.pdf 
As the Water Distribution Accord shows above, the province Punjab got the largest share of water 
in comparison with the other provinces. 
3.5. Current shortage of water and electricity in Pakistan 
Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) is a federal government institution for the 
integrated development of water and power resources in Pakistan. WAPDA publishes its feasibility 
and planning reports about the water resources every year. According to WAPDA Feasibility Report 
2009, with increased population, Pakistan is moving towards a situation of water shortage. The per 
capita surface water availability was 5260 cubic meters in 1951 when population was 34 million. In 
2010, when Pakistan had an estimated population of 172 million people it was reduced to 1038 
cubic meter. The WAPDA claimed that in order to meet the increasing demands of water in the 
country, the implementation of the KBD project was necessary. The WAPDA claimed further in the 
report that the demand of electricity was increasing by the day so the construction of hydro power 
project like KBD would be necessary to meet the growing demand of electricity in the country. 
Furthermore, the WAPDA’s Development Plan (2009) also described the alarming situation of 
shortage of electricity in the country by emphasizing that the national demand of electricity had 
been growing rapidly. At present the electric power generating capacity in the country is only 18000 
MW from all the hydropower, thermal and nuclear sources. The demand of electricity is growing at 
10% annually. Power shortage in the industrial, agricultural and domestic sectors has been evident 
for the past few years with the shortage assuming critical proportions last year. Pakistan has to 
depend primarily on hydropower for cheap electricity. So, the implementation of the KBD project 
was considered as necessary to meet the demands of power in the country. 
3.6. Salient features of the KBD project 
The Kalabagh dam is planned to be built at 210 kilometers downstream of the Tarbela dam on the 
Indus River. The proposed site for the dam is situated at Kalabagh in Mianwali District of the 
Punjab province, bordering the KPK Province in the north of Pakistan(Jang, 01 June 2006). 
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Figure2. The Proposed site for KBD Project 
Source:http://www.pakistanpatriot.com/2008/05/27/kalabagh-dam-dropped-without-discussion-in-
parliament/kbd7/ 
According to Water and Power Development Authority in Pakistan (WAPDA, 2007) the KBD 
project can meet the growing needs of water and electricity in Pakistan as it will have enough water 
storage capacity and electricity production capacity. The KBD project will create a reservoir with 
usable storage of 6.1 MAF. The project will have two spillways on the right bank for the disposal of 
flood water. In the event of highest probable flood, these spillways will have discharge capacity of 
over two million cusec of water. On the left bank, a power house with the power generation capacity 
of 3600 MW will be installed (WAPDA Kalabagh Project Report, 2007). 
 3.7. Historical overview of politics over the KBD project 
This section of study explains the hydro politics over the KBD project. Moreover, it describes how 
the harsh words have been exchanged among stakeholders. These harsh words lead towards 
misunderstandings and misinterpretations during the communication process and has added a 
specific aspect to the conflict by escalating it further.  
The main stakeholders in the KBD project are the provincial governments of Sindh, Punjab, KPK 
and the federal government of Pakistan. The KBD project does not affect the Balochistan province 
in any way but its provincial government supports the view point of other smaller provinces against 
the federal government. Each province has its own national and linguistic identity. People living in 
the province Punjab speak Punjabi language and they are fifty six percent of the total population of 
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the country. They hold the majority status. Sindhi people are living in province Sindh and they 
speak Sindhi language. They are seventeen percent of the total population of country. Moreover, 
tribal people speaking Pushto language are of sixteen percent of country’s population. They are 
living in KPK province. Balochi speaking people are living in Balochistan province and they are 
eleven percent of country’ population (Rehman, 1997).  
The federal government appointed Kalabagh consultants (five engineering firms) to produce project 
proposals for the KBD project in 1982 (WAPDA Project Planning Report, 2007). When the report 
was published in 1984, different provincial governments started opposition against the project. On 
the one side, the chief ministers of the KPK and the Sindh provinces said “We were not included in 
the preparation plan of KBD project so we would resign as chief ministers of our provinces and 
would not accept the KBD plan anyway”. After this statement the KBD project took on a political 
dimension between federal government and the provincial governments (Sindh &KPK). On the 
other side, one of the provincial ministers of province Punjab stated “The KBD project was 
beneficial for the progress of the country as it was helpful to generate electricity and store water for 
the irrigation of crops so, I would strongly support the construction of this project” (Jang, October 
21, 1990). 
According to local and national press
2
 the KBD project caused more controversy in provincial 
relations when a powerful disapproval for the dam was shown by the political parties of the Sindh 
province at a twelve party’s convention on March7, 1988. Twelve local political parties of the Sindh 
province participated in the convention and representatives of these local political parties expressed 
their strong opposition against the KBD project. They also tried to convince the Sindhi people to go 
against the KBD project by saying the provincial government of Punjab would get more share of 
water by the construction of KBD dam. The Sindh chief minister also claimed “The Indus Water 
Treaty had been violated many times by Punjab and the farmers of my province faced water 
shortage during their crop seasons”. The Awami National Party of KPK province also organized the 
Peshawar convention against the KBD project in 1988. Bacha Khan (one of the leaders of this party) 
said “I would leave no stone unturned to stop the implementation of the KBD project and even 
would be happy to sacrifice my life in resistance to the implementation of this project. Moreover, I 
also consider the dam as the conspiracy by the Punjab government against the smaller provinces” 
(Ibid). 
                                                          
2
 National press (The Dawn) and local press (The Kawish), March 8, 1988. 
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The federal government responded to the protests against the KBD project by saying that the 
government would adopt all the possible measures to overcome the difficulties of the smaller 
provinces and the controversies among provinces would be settled before June, 1988. Meanwhile, 
the World Bank also gave a final warning that if the matters between the provinces and the federal 
government were not solved before June, 1988, then they would withdraw from their financial 
support for the KBD project. In response to the World Bank warning, the federal government 
suggested a roundtable conference to start a dialogue among stakeholders which would also include 
federal technical experts and engineers. The federal government described that the purpose of the 
dialogue would be the development of consensus among different stakeholders (Dawn, April 24, 
1988).Before the beginning of the dialogue on the KBD project, the federal government was 
dismissed on May 29, 1988 due to the alleged corruption charges. Many representatives of the 
federal government that were taking part in the dialogue had to resign from their positions within 
the federal government, so the dialogue between different stakeholders could not be held. A care 
take government was established to conduct new elections. Ghulam Mustafa Khar, the federal 
minister for Water and Power of this government said “The KBD project would be constructed at all 
costs” (Ahmad, 1995:7-8).  
After the formation of a new federal government in 1991, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif struggled to 
reach on a consensus over the construction of the KBD project. The government of the Punjab 
province clarified that according to the fixation of Water Accord1991, Sindh provincial government 
would get up to 2.1 MAF (Million Acer Feet) of water from the KBD project. Still the federal 
government remained unsuccessful in convincing the provincial government of Sindh and KPK 
over the construction of dam (Malik, 2003). 
In 1993, Benazir Bhutto from the Sindh Province was elected Prime Minister and after that the KBD 
project was included in the priority list of the federal government (Ahmad, 2004). But the provincial 
assembly of KPK province unanimously passed the resolution against the project by saying that lot 
of people would be displaced by the implementation of the KBD project and it would be difficult for 
the federal government to re-settle and compensate all the displaced people. Furthermore, all the 
energy needs of the country should be achieved through other projects running in the country 
(Rajput, 2004). 
In October 1999, General Pervez Mushraff imposed martial law in the country. During his regime, 
the debate over the KBD project was more intense compared to the previous governments in the 
country (Surrendra, 2003). Musharraf re-announced the construction of this project by saying “The 
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KBD project would proceed against any opposition and the federal government will topple any 
provincial government that opposes the project” (Fulcher, R. March 15, 2006). Four3 political 
parties in Punjab province united to protest against the proposed dam. The rally held in Lahore was 
charged by police and the activists of these parties were beaten up. Farooq Tariq, an organizer of the 
rally said “We oppose the dam because it would deny smaller provinces their share of water and 
would benefit the Punjab ruling class. Another leader of a political party Mr. Asfand Yar Wali Khan 
stated “Pakistan and the Kalabagh dam cannot co-exist. We are opposed to the disintegration of the 
country but if the establishment is bent on drowning its own people then we will choose how we 
want to die” (Ibid). In his speech he expressed that the dam was technically unfeasible and it would 
increase flooding problem in the areas of KPK province. The other political parties from the 
province Sindh (Pakistan People’s Party) and the Punjab (Muslim League Nawaz) opposed the 
KBD project by saying that the government was undemocratic
4
. Halepoto, November 17, 2008). It 
can be observed that Muslim League Nawaz has been supporting the KBD project since its 
beginning but it has shown its disapproval for a specific period of time when country was run by a 
military ruler. 
The KBD project has been lingering on over past few decades among the different provinces of 
Pakistan. Recently in 2010, Pakistan faced severe flood problems in most part of the country due to 
the overflow of water in Indus River. After this flooding the debate over the KBD project sparked 
again. The Prime Minister, Yousaf Raza Gilani (2008-2012) claimed that the implementation of the 
KBD project would have averted much of the flood devastation in the country (Paktribune, Aug. 10, 
2010).  
To sum up, the federal government and the provincial government of Punjab province emphasized 
the need of the KBD project in different time periods. They claimed that the project was beneficial 
for the progress of the country as it was helpful to generate electricity and store water for the 
irrigation of crops. But the regional and ethnic political parties of smaller provinces did not accept 
these claims. They considered the KBD project as a conspiracy by the Punjab government and argue 
that Punjabi people would get more benefits from the dam. In a nutshell, stakeholders have not 
                                                          
3
 The National Workers Party, The Labor Party Pakistan (LPP), The Pakistan Mazdoor Mehaz and the Mazdoor Kissan 
Party 
4
After the implementation 1973 Constitution, country experienced military regimes in (1977-1987) and (1999-2008) 
(Askari, 2011). See also chapter 5 “Analysis of Interprovincial Relations and their Effect on the Controversy of KBD 
Conflict” 
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trusted each other since the announcement of the KBD project and many times harsh words have 
been exchanged among them. 
4. Stakeholders and their View Point on the KBD Project 
It has been mentioned earlier that the main stakeholders in the KBD project are the provincial 
governments of Sindh, Punjab, KPK and the federal government of Pakistan. This section describes 
the political and administrative structure of these stakeholders. Moreover, it explains the power 
struggle and water dispute management institutions among stakeholders. Further, it describes the 
view point of different stakeholders on the KBD project. 
4.1.Political and administrative structure of federal and provincial governments 
The Government in Pakistanis a federal parliamentary system, where the President is considered as 
the head of state and the Prime Minister as the head of government. The parliament of Pakistan 
consists of two Houses to be known respectively as the national assembly and the senate. Members 
of the national assembly are elected by direct voting in a constituency through a secret ballot. The 
candidate, who obtains the highest number of votes in a constituency, is elected as a member of 
national assembly or provincial assembly depending upon the candidate whether he is running for 
national assembly or provincial assembly. The political party, which has the most elected members 
in national assembly, establishes a new government in the country. In the same way, any political 
party having the majority of the elected members in any province establishes a government in that 
province. It means any elected government represents the mind-set of the most of the people living 
in that province. Pakistan is a federation of four provinces. The Seats in the national assembly are 
allocated to each province on basis of their population (Blood, 1994).The constituency-wise detail 
of seats in the National Assembly is as under: 
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Table3. 
 
National Assembly-Number of Seats 
Province General seats 
Punjab 148 
Sindh 61 
KPK 35 
Balochistan 14 
Source: (Table modified by author based on Election Commission of Pakistan, 2008) 
Each province has a governor, a council of ministers headed by a chief minister appointed by the 
governor, and a provincial assembly. There is division of responsibilities between federal and 
provincial governments. Most of the services in the provincial areas such as health, education, 
agriculture, and roads, for example, are managed by the provincial governments. Federal 
government can also legislate in these areas for the sake of national policy and international aspects 
of those services (Ibid) 
4.2.Power struggle and division of powers between federal and provincial governments 
In 1947, Pakistan adopted the Government of India Act 1935 with some amendments as the interim 
constitution, with an assumption that the new country will function as a federation
5
. But, the 
amendments in that constitution further strengthened the control of the central government over the 
provinces. The newly born country inherited weak democratic institutions. The only developed 
institutions after independence were the colonial bureaucracy and the military. Both these 
institutions were part of the central government. The supremacy of the central government was 
established from day one due to the absence of other representative institutions (Mushtaq, 2009). 
                                                          
5
According to Oxford dictionary federation is “a group of states with a central government but independence in 
internal affairs” 
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The first Constitution of Pakistan was promulgated in 1956.The distribution of legislative powers 
between the federation and the federating units were enumerated in three lists
6
. The federal 
legislative list had thirty items, the provincial list ninety and the concurrent list only had nineteen 
items. Considerable powers were given to provincial legislatures. But, the constitution was 
abolished by the martial law administration of General Ayub Khan in 1958 just after the two years 
of its implementation. He introduced a highly centralized Constitution in 1962. This Constitution 
provided a Presidential form of government and a single legislative list of forty nine federal subjects 
including defense, external affairs, inter-provincial trade and commerce etc. (Goraya, 2010). 
The current constitution of Pakistan was adopted in 1973 by the federal government of Pakistan. 
Provincial autonomy and the recognition of the right of the self determination
7
 of the people were 
promised in the constitution of 1973 but this constitution was abrogated from time to time by the 
rule of different military regimes in the country (Rehman, 2010). 
From 1977 until 1987, the country was under the leadership of General Zia-ul-Haq, a military ruler who 
restricted the political activities of all political parties. Another military government took over the 
country in October 1999, when General Pervez Musharraf displaced Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s 
civilian government and returned the country to military rule. Both regimes tempered the 
constitution of the country to serve their own power and interests and the promise of provincial 
autonomy was not fulfilled. Political parties in the country including the PPP and MLN
8
 could not 
help people to restore democracy and the provincial autonomy of the provinces because of lack of 
effective internal organization and restrictions imposed by military regimes (Askari, 2011). 
Democracy was restored again in 2008 after the establishment of a new civilian government. 
President Zardari (2008-continue) signed a new law named “18th Amendment into Pakistan’s 
Constitution” on April 19, 2010.It empowered provinces to raise loans at home and abroad. In an 
innovative measure, it provided for joint and equal ownership of the mineral wealth found in a 
province or its adjacent waters by the federation and the provinces. The Amendment abolished the 
                                                          
6
 According to political science dictionary legislative list refers to the jurisdiction of an authority to legislate and to 
exercise executive powers within a specified area. For example, federal legislative list means that federal government 
has jurisdiction over a particular item/department and it has the power and authority to enact, execute, and enforce 
general legislation within that department. 
7
According to United Nations’ international covenant on economic, social and cultural rights; all people have the right 
of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development. 
8
Pakistan people’s Party (PPP), Muslim League Nawaz (MLN) 
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concurrent list in principle and transferred forty of its forty seven subjects to provinces. In a 
nutshell, this amendment of law enhanced provincial autonomy and transferred residuary powers to 
the provinces (Fair, 2011) 
4.3.Institutional arrangements for water management  
This section describes the major water management institution in Pakistan, which is named 
WAPDA. Also, this section shows how WAPDA works in planning, investigating and the 
implementation of different water resource projects in the country. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure3. 
Source: Diagram by Author 
WAPDA was formed in 1959 to carry out the tasks of investigating, planning and executing 
schemes for irrigation, drainage. WAPDA is as an autonomous body from the Ministry of Water 
and Power but it works in collaboration with this ministry. WAPDA is responsible for the integrated 
development of water and power resources in Pakistan. The organization was also given the   
responsibility of implementing the Indus Basin Settlement Plan that was signed by India and 
Pakistan in 1960 to develop replacement works for management of rivers and irrigation systems. 
Since then, WAPDA has been working with water development projects by doing extensive 
research and investigation to expand country's water resources. 
WAPDA 
Water and Power 
Development 
Authority 
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The Water Wing of WAPDA controls the water sector in the entire country. The Water Wing is 
divided into north, central and south zones, generally covering the North Western Frontier 
Provinces (KPK) and the provinces of Punjab and Sindh respectively. Presently, the two major 
water reservoirs of the country, the Tarbela dam and the Mangla dam are operated by WAPDA. The 
Planning Division of the Water Wing, headed by a General Manager, looks after all planning 
activities in the water reservoirs. The power wing of WAPDA is responsible for hydropower 
generation, transmission and its distribution. Moreover, it collects revenue from all the electricity 
consumers (WAPDA, 2011). 
The Water Resources Planning Organization (WRPO) is responsible for preparing, reviewing and 
updating water sector development plans. It also conducts the research for WAPDA and Federal 
Ministry of Water and Power on different irrigation projects and water resources by considering the 
social and environmental factors. After carrying out the research WRPO designs policies used to 
implement these projects. WRPO comprises five multidisciplinary directorates namely: Directorate 
of Irrigation & Drainage, Agriculture, Economics, Computer Application and Environment under 
Project Director (WRPO). These all units work together to formulate any policy on water resources 
(Ibid). 
4.4. Special institutions for water dispute resolution 
I. Council of Common Interest (CCI) 
Provincial governments of Pakistan also share the authority over water resource management with 
the federal government. This authority is understood as a part of provincial autonomy according to 
the constitution of the country. After the passage of 18
th
Constitutional Amendment
9
, CCI is the 
supreme institute to settle center-province or inter-provincial conflicts over water resource 
management. It exercises supervision and control over other water dispute institutes like IRSA. The 
Council membership comprises of all four provincial chief ministers and an equal number of 
members from the federal government to be nominated by the Prime Minister. Normally, the Prime 
Minister chairs the council; otherwise the President can nominate a federal minister as chairperson 
of the council. CCI presents its report on any conflict to both houses of parliament. The council 
made its quarterly meetings mandatory, provided for a permanent secretariat and expanded its 
                                                          
9
 The18
th
 Amendment has been done under Article 153-154 of the Constitution of 1973 
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mandate to include supervision and control over other water management institutions. These 
changes potentially increase its importance (Waseem, 2010). 
II. Indus River System Authority (IRSA) 
Indus River System Authority (IRSA)is a federal government organization. It was established under 
the IRSA Act of 1992 at the time of inter-provincial Water Apportionment Accord of 
1991(described in chapter 2). The accord apportioned the water among the four provinces. It also 
established a formula to distribute surplus and scarcity of water. The function of IRSA is to   
allocate and lay down the basis for the regulation and distribution of available surface water among 
the provinces. Moreover, it also settles any question that may arise between two or more provinces 
in respect of distribution of river and reservoir waters. But any decision of the authority can be 
challenged and reviewed by CCI. The IRSA is expected to issue directives to provincial 
governments and WAPDA. These directives are termed as binding for them. The authority consists 
of five members. One representing every province and the Chairman is appointed by the federal 
government (The Ministry of Water and Power, 2012). 
In the wake of current water scarcity and other water related problems among the provinces of 
Pakistan, the authority holds an important position in water conflict management. Earlier, IRSA had 
no source of income and its expenses were met through federal government grants but now, it 
charge water utilization tax from the provinces. The collected tax will be used to return the grant of 
federal government (Pakistan Today, 9 June 2012). 
To sum up, WAPDA is an autonomous body works with the collaboration of federal ministry of 
water and power. Its main functions are planning, controlling water reservoirs and collecting 
revenues from the consumers of electricity. IRSA works at federal level and its main function is to 
allocate water to all the provinces. It can also settle water disputes among different provinces but its 
decisions can be reviewed by CCI. Hence, CCI is the most powerful institution to settle water 
disputes in the country. 
4.5. Objections of the provincial governments  
The provincial government of the KPK province has been opposing the construction of dam in the 
last decades. They have different concerns over the implementation of the KBD project. According 
to the provincial government of KPK, the construction of this dam would increase the flooding of 
the Peshawar Valley including the town of Nowshera. The provincial government has also claimed 
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that the drainages of surrounding areas of Mardan, Pabbi and Swabi plains would be adversely 
affected by the KBD reservoir thus creating water-logging
10
 and salinity. Their strongest 
apprehension however was the displacement of large number of people. The provincial government 
was worried because in the past, the federal government could not provide proper compensation to 
the people who were displaced due to the construction of the Terbela dam. Moreover, the provincial 
government of KPK also argued that the fertile cultivated land in the province would be submerged 
(Kalabagh Dam Project Report, 2007:5-8). 
The provincial government of Sindh also has reservations regarding the construction of the KBD 
project. The provincial government was opposing the KBD project on the basis of following 
reservations: the provincial government claimed that the project would convert the Sindh province 
into a desert because there would be no surplus water to fill the reservoir; and a mangrove forest, 
located near sea water, that is already threatened, would be further affected adversely (WAPDA 
Report, 2007:9-11) Government of Punjab has no objection over the construction of the KBD 
project. On October 2010, the assembly of the Punjab province passed the resolution
11
in favor of the 
project. Moreover, Punjab government said that the federal government experts and engineers say 
that the Kalabagh dam is feasible and beneficial for all of Pakistan; therefore, it should start its 
efforts for the development of a consensus among all the four provinces for the earliest construction 
of the dam (Dawn, 06 October 2011). 
4.6. Justifications by WAPDA and other experts to the concerns of provincial governments 
WAPDA responded to the concerns of the different provinces by carrying out research with the help 
of their experts and engineers. The first concern of the provincial government of KPK was that the 
construction of the KBD project would increase the flooding of Peshawar Valley including 
Nowshera town which is located in KPK province. 
 
According to WAPDA (2007), the Kalabagh reservoir would stop about ten miles downstream of 
Nowshera town so this town would not be flooded. This claim of WAPDA was later reviewed and 
supported by a panel of technical experts appointed by the government of KPK province. 
 
                                                          
10
 According to Oxford dictionary, water logging is a condition of ground when it becomes so full ofwater that it cannot 
hold any more and becomes flooded 
11
 According to the constitution of 1973, resolution passed by any provincial government is not binding on federal 
government. However, federal government may consider the resolution if it is found in general public interest. 
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The second concern of KPK provincial government was about the displacement of local people by 
the construction of the dam. The WAPDA promised however, that properties like land, trees, 
buildings that would be affected by the KBD project would be compensated at market price 
according to the present land acquisition act in the country. It was proposed to offer alternative land 
with minimum 12.5 acres to the land owning families, requiring all about 74,000 acres of irrigated 
land. The non-agriculturist affected people from the KBD project would be given entrepreneurship 
knowledge and training so they would be able to invest their compensation money in skillful ways, 
thus giving them an assured means of livelihood for future (WAPDA Kalabagh dam Report, 2007). 
 
The major concern of the government in the Sindh province was that the KBD dam would convert 
the province into desert by reducing already available water to province. WAPDA responded by 
saying that the KBD project will not consume more water but it will only store water during flood 
season and make it available on a crop demand basis during the remaining dry periods of the year. 
The real demonstration of this available water for crops was observed after the construction of the 
Tarbela dam in 1976. Before the construction the Tarbela dam, the average annual canal 
withdrawals for the Sindh provincial government was 35.6 Million Acer Feet, but after the 
construction of the Tarbela dam, it increased with over 24 percent to 44.2 MAF. By keeping in view 
the past increase in water share of the Sindh provincial government, WAPDA engineers estimated 
that after the construction of the KBD dam, the canal withdrawals for the Sindh province would be 
further increased by 2.25 MAF annually (Ashfaque, 12 Dec.2005). 
 
Moreover, according to Pakistan Engineering Congress
12
 (2011:294) “The KBD project is 
indispensable to meet the growing needs of water and power in the Country. There is no alternative 
to this project for providing the hydropower (3600 MW) and irrigation water (6.1 MAF) in the 
coming years. Further, Sindh province would get more benefit from the KBD project as it is 
deficient in rainfall and sweet ground water. Our experts have confirmed the technical and financial 
viability of this project. We have already lost more than two decades in the pursuit of its 
implementation. No more time should be lost in keeping the matter dormant” (Ibid).  In addition to 
this, Bashir A. Malik (a water expert and former chief technical advisor of the World Bank and 
                                                          
12
 Pakistan Engineering Congress is the oldest independent engineering body of the sub-continent that was established 
in 1912. Earlier, it was named Punjab engineering Congress. It offers opportunities for sharing of knowledge and 
experiences of the engineering practices for promotion of professional development in the country. Available 
at:[pecongress.org.pk] 
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United Nations) has said "The Sindh and KPK provinces would face drought conditions if the KBD 
project was not implemented in next few years" (The News International, 10 October 2011). 
 
5. Analysis of Interprovincial Relations and their Effect on the Controversy of KBD Conflict 
It has been discussed in the chapter “Stakeholders and their view point on the KBD project” of the 
study that stakeholders have divergence of views on the construction of the KBD project despite 
having water management institutions. So, it is very important to analyze the reasons of such 
disagreement which lead to the failure of water management institutions like IRSA and CCI. This 
chapter deals with the factors that are responsible for interprovincial disharmony and also are the 
main contributors to the intensification of the KBD conflict. 
5.1. National Financial Commission Awards (NFC) 
One reason for the intensified conflict over the KBD project is the NFC Awards. Article 160 of the 
constitution of Pakistan says that after every five years the president shall constitute a National 
Finance Commission. This National Finance Commission will review the formula for the 
distribution of funds, taxes and other monetary assets among the federal government and among the 
provinces of Pakistan. This formula of distribution of resources is named National Financial 
Commission Award(NFC). Different types of taxes are collected in each province by the federal 
government, and then re-distributed to provinces according to the NFC formula (see Table3). The 
resources from which the taxes are collected are as following: income tax, wealth tax, taxes on the 
sales and purchase in all provinces, custom duties and export duties on cotton.  
Pakistan has had six NFC awards since 1973, three out of six NFC awards had been enforced in 
1974, 1991 and in 1997. But the three NFCs constituted in 1979, 1984 and 2,000 failed to reach any 
consensus over the distribution formula of resources because Punjab government insisted on 
resource distribution on the basis of population as Punjab is the most populated province in 
Pakistan. The other three provincial governments (KPK, Sindh and Balochistan) demanded on 
giving importance to the revenue generated by each province and the level of poverty in the 
provinces (Ahmed, et. al., 2007). 
The Fifth NFC Award adopted in 1997, was supposed to be valid for five years but the failure of 
agreement on a sixth NFC award in 2000, kept the fifth award in operation. According to the 1997 
award, 63 percent of the pooled taxes would go to the federal government and 37% to the provinces 
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and the percentage of distribution would be slightly changed each year. Allocation of the share to 
each provincial government out of 37% was as follow; 
 
Table4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Government of Pakistan (2006) The Gazette of Pakistan, “An Order further to amend the 
Distribution of Revenues and Grants-in-Aids Order, 1997”. OrderNo.1. Ministry of Law, Justice 
and Human Rights. 
It can be observed from the above table that most of the pooled tax percentage was allocated to 
provincial government of Punjab by the federal government. According to the report of national 
finance commission (2006), based on the average of the years 1997 to 2000, the approximate 
percentages of pooled taxes collected by each province were 65 percent from Sindh, 25 percent 
from Punjab, 7 percent from KPK, and 3 percent from Balochistan province. So, the largest share of 
taxes was collected from the Sindh province but the largest share of resources was re-distributed to 
the Punjab province (ibid). 
The above section shows that the provinces and federal government had been involved in conflict 
since the beginning of NFC awards in 1973 and many times the award had not been enforced 
because of the failure of consensus among stakeholders. It can be assumed here that the differences 
among provinces over NFC awards might be one of the reasons which lead them to the opposition 
of the KBD project. Provincial governments especially the Sindh and KPK might have an earlier 
 
 
Province 
 
 
 
Percentage of re-distribution 
of resources out of total 
collected resources by federal govt. 
 
Punjab 
 
50.00% 
 
Sindh 
 
34.85% 
 
KPK 
 
9.93% 
 
Balochistan 
 
5.22% 
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perception from NFC awards grants that the federal government didn’t listen to their needs so they 
would not be able to get their rightful water share from the KBD project as well. So, after the 
announcement of KBD project in 1982, the chief ministers of the KPK and the Sindh provinces 
opposed the project plan and did not accept  it anyway (Hoti, 1990). 
5.2. Ethnicity and water politics 
A second reason for the intensified conflict over the KBD project is the problem of ethnicity in the 
country. Pakistan has ethnically diverse population in its four provinces. People in each province 
have their own linguistic identity as they speak different languages. The Punjabi people have 
majority both numerically (56 percent of the total population) and militarily (80 percent) of the 
army. Military has been ruling power in Pakistan many times since its inception. The ruling military 
having appropriated state power, identified the state and the  nation  narrowly  with  their  own  
particular  purposes  and  interests. Their major focus was to prolong their regimes at any cost. In 
the eyes of other smaller ethnic groups, the Pakistani 'nation' has been appropriated by Punjabis who 
dominate the military and civil bureaucracy. This dominance has incited resentment and distrust 
among other small provinces and they think themselves as subject peoples who have not been given 
their rightful place in the army and civil bureaucracy of the country. These ethnic strains have given 
rise to the regional and ethnic political parties in every province (Ishtiaq, 2006). 
Earlier, it has been explained (under section 3.4 of this study) that there was dispute among different 
provincial governments over the share of water after the construction of the Mangla and Tarbela 
dams. The provincial governments of the smaller provinces accused the provincial government of 
Punjab for stealing their water share from these reservoirs. However, this dispute was settled under 
the Water Accord 1991. In case of the KBD project, Punjab government and federal government 
have promised that all the stakeholders would get rightful share of water after its construction. And, 
many technical experts from Pakistan Engineering Congress and even from smaller provinces 
confirmed the technical and financial feasibility of the project as claimed by WAPDA. Moreover, 
one of the former chief ministers of KPK province stated that dam would give more benefit to KPK 
province as it would irrigate a large area of land in that province. But the regional and ethnic 
political parties of smaller provinces are not ready to accept these claims. They consider the KBD 
project as a conspiracy by the Punjab government and argue that Punjabi people have strong 
influence in civil and military bureaucracy so it is obvious that they would get more benefits from 
the dam. They also think that dam would favor the people of Punjab province at the expense of their 
people. 
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5.3. Ineffective role of Council of Common Interests (CCI) 
A third reason for the intensified conflict over the KBD project is the ineffective role of CCI in 
water dispute management. CCI is powerful in theory but weak in practice. Procedurally, settlement 
of disputes often becomes a function of relations between the two or more parties involved in the 
dispute. The meetings of CCI are few and far between. This makes CCI ineffective as an 
institutional for conflict resolution. The purpose of CCI was laid down in the constitution to address 
the demands of the provincial governments of all provinces. But, many times the leaders of the 
different political parties in the provincial constituent assemblies has expressed a strong resentment 
against the absolute control exercised by the federal government over the matters of electricity, river 
waters and dam projects. The KBD project is an example of hegemony of federal government over 
CCI. A decision of CCI has an obligatory effect on the federal government unless the decision is 
modified by the parliament of Pakistan. But the KBD issue has not been presented before CCI by 
federal government since last decade. Recently, Lahore High Court sought a reply from federal 
government and CCI over not taking the issue of the KBD seriously. In an answer, a written reply is 
submitted on behalf of the CCI said that they have no objection and work on the project would be 
started after the federal government issued directions to this effect (Dawn, 31 May 2012). 
5.4. Politicization of Indus River System Authority (IRSA) 
The fourth reason for the intensified conflict over the KBD project is the politicization of IRSA. 
IRSA was considered a hopeful sign to solve out water dispute after its establishment. But, soon it 
provoked criticism even led to the temporary abrogation of Water Accord 1991 in 1994 by Prime 
Minister Bhutto. He belonged to province Sindh, so he awarded a greater share of water to Sindh by 
proposing a different formula. After few years, IRSA has been drawn into the wider dispute 
between the provincial governments when Sindh government accused that Punjab government was 
delegating a chairperson so the federal government would take the side of Punjab government in the 
allocation of water resources. Resultantly, IRSA was dragged into interprovincial rivalry and power 
politics on federal and provincial levels. Each province expected to draw more benefits from getting 
its respective elected chairperson for IRSA (Paukert, 2002). Another challenge to the authority of 
IRSA comes from WAPDA. It is an autonomous body and it collects revenues on the consumption 
of electricity from all over the country. IRSA was facing funding problems from the federal 
government so CCI requested WAPDA to pay water tax on the generation of hydro electricity to 
IRSA. Because IRSA allocates water to all the provinces and the electricity is generated from that 
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water. In response, WAPDA challenged the authority of IRSA in managing water allocation to 
provinces and refused to pay this electricity surcharge to IRSA. Hence, both the institutes locked 
horns over hydro power generation tax. (The Nation, 21 October 2011). 
The issue of the KBD project has also been discussed in the meetings of IRSA but strong opposition 
by the governments of smaller provinces has marked the limits of the authority. No consensus has 
been reached on the implementation of the KBD project during these meetings (Ibid). 
5.5. Case Study of the Tarbela Dam Project (TDP) 
In order to get a more comprehensive picture on the struggle and opposition behind the proposed 
KBD project, it is important to take a look at the politics and effects surrounding another major dam 
project, the Tarbela Dam Project. The TDP is also built on the Indus River (see map on pp. 15).It is 
located in Haripur district in KPK province. The dam was completed in 1974 and was designed to 
store water from the Indus River for irrigation and hydroelectric power generation (Tate et.al, 2000). 
5.5.1. Economic impacts of TDP 
The rural farming population that directly got irrigation benefits was estimated to be in the order of 
seven to ten million. The cultivated and irrigated area was also increased after the construction of 
TDP. The increase in cultivated area was twelve percent from 1975 to 1998. There was an evident 
shift in the cropping pattern in the Indus basin and increases in the cropped area were found for 
wheat (36%), cotton (44%), rice (39%) and sugarcane (52%). Hence, a considerable increase in crop 
production was observed (Asianics Agro-Dev. Int. Final Report, 2000). 
 Moreover, average annual power generation from TDP during 1978-98 was 9255 Gigawatt Hour 
(GWh), 82% of predicted before the construction of the project. After installing of full capacity in 
1993, the average annual generation was 14300 GWh in 1993-98.Major beneficiaries have been the 
enterprising industrialists who received cheap electricity. It helped them reducing their cost of 
production. The provincial government of KPK where TDP is located, has been receiving Rs.6 
billion ($139 million in1998 prices) in annual royalty from hydropower generation at Tarbela (Ibid). 
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5.5.2. Social impacts 
I. Livelihood of affected people and their problems 
More than 3 million people particularly in Thatta and Badin areas were involved in fisheries. 
Landless and poor communities of Keti Bandar and Ibrahim Hydri areas were dependent on forest 
land. They used to make different products from forests for their earnings. More than twenty percent 
of people living in TDP area were working as labor in agriculture sector. All these communities 
faced negative consequences after the construction of this dam. Fish catches were considered to 
have decreased significantly as a result of reduced dry season flows in the Indus River. People in 
Ibrahim Hyderi and Keti Bandar, stated that the upstream development like TDP has reduced the 
flow of river water below Kotri into the Indus delta (Trar, 2006). This has resulted in a reduced 
supply of fresh water for drinking purposes and for agriculture. The intrusion of sea water has been 
gradually increasing and agriculture in the delta has received a severe setback. Mangrove forests 
and fish breeding grounds have also been negatively affected. There has been a large-scale 
migration of population from the lower Indus delta to Karachi city and its adjacent areas in search of 
new livelihood. Owing to the increased agricultural mechanization there was some displacement of 
farm labor that had to find alternative livelihoods in the urban areas. Apart from harmful 
consequences, some positive trends in the livelihood of affected people were also found. For 
example employment in agro-industries like cotton and sugarcane-related industries had increased 
manifold. Moreover, during the peak construction period, a labor force of about 15,000 was 
employed at TDP construction place. This has helped to train highly skilled manpower for further 
national and international development projects (Ibid). 
 
II. Resettlement issue 
According to Cernea and Michael (1996) developmental projects like dams changes the status quo 
of the many people who are displaced by these projects. It may bring undesirable consequences for 
the displaced people if they are not resettled properly, so it is highly important to resettle them 
again. 
The total number of villages affected from the construction of TDP were one hundred and twenty, 
and the number of people affected closer to 96, 000. The complexities of the problems arising from 
the displacement of such large number of people prompted the government to create a separate 
organization known as the Tarbela Dam Resettlement Organization. This organization was 
38 
 
responsible for the assessment and payment of compensation for the properties of displaced people. 
The main criterion for compensation with alternate land was whether land holdings were greater 
than 0.2 Hectare (ha) of irrigated land or 0.8ha of rain fed land. Approximately two-thirds of the 
affected population was found eligible for replacement land. People with houses in the affected area 
were to be paid cash compensations. The Tarbela Dam Resettlement Organization however not 
solve out the problems of many people who were displaced during the construction of TDP. Some 
of the affected people by the TDP then decided to contact the High Court for compensation but the 
federal ministry for water and power claimed that all legitimate compensations for the displaced 
people had already been made and there was no need to re-open this issue. In 1999 there were 
twenty-seven cases under litigation in different courts between the affected people and WAPDA 
over the compensation money and land (Rafiq, 26 July 26, 1999). 
 
5.5.3. Consequences of TDP for the KBD project  
 
According to Ely Erslana et.al. (2000) livelihood of people living in the proposed area of the KBD 
project is quite similar to the livelihood of TDP. People are involved in agriculture-sector labor. 
They are dependent on the mangrove forests and fisheries for their earnings.  
 
It can be observed from the above section of study that the implementation of TDP had adversely 
affected the livelihood of people. In many cases, negative impacts were the result of inadequate 
compensation and loss of livelihood leading to lowered social status. So, it can be assumed that the 
future concerns of the stakeholders of the KBD project about the mangrove forests and livelihood of 
their people are based from the past experience of the similar situation. Moreover, the case study of 
TDP shows that the displaced people are not re-settled properly. And, their compensation cases are 
still lingering on in the courts. As a result, during the preparations for other hydro power projects in 
the country as for example the KBD project, the KPK provincial government agitated against 
unsatisfactory resettlement of the displaced people. 
 
No doubt, there was an inadequate participation of stakeholders in the decision-making processes 
regarding compensation of livelihood and re-settlement issues in TDP. But, TDP had numerous 
positive impacts on the water storage capacity, agricultural economy and power generation capacity 
of the country. Similarly, the construction of the KBD project would definitely ease the water and 
power difficulties of the country. 
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5.6. Case study of Sardar Sarovar Project (SSP) in India 
The case study of SSP explains how the Indian government managed to implement this project 
despite all the opposition from different stakeholders. Moreover, this case study helps to understand 
the major difficulties in achieving consensus on the implementation of the KBD project. 
 In April 1961, India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, laid the foundation stone for the SSP 
on the Narmada River near Navagam in Gujarat. This was a hydropower project and from its 
beginning it became a controversial issue between the governments of the Indian states of Gujrat, 
Maharashtra and Madhya Pardesh over the height of the dam, re-settlement of displaced people, the 
sharing of costs and the share of power generation by this project (Komala, 2006). 
In order to resolve the inter-state differences, the government of India established the Narmada 
Water Dispute Tribunal in October 1969. The tribunal declared its final decision in August 1978, 
which included the formula to allocate the water, power, and costs of the SSP among all 
stakeholders. The tribunal also described the obligations of three involved states to families affected 
by the SSP; in particular, the tribunal guaranteed every displaced family losing land to be 
compensated properly. The government of Madhya Pardesh accepted the decision of the tribunal. In 
1985, the World Bank came into a credit and loan agreement with the government of India to fund 
the SSP. The construction on the dam accelerated, and with it came countless unanticipated 
challenges of rehabilitation of local people. Many of the Narmada riverbank residents living in 
secluded villages were left out of the rehabilitation process. Frustration and resentment of affected 
communities led them to start a social movement named Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA) against 
the construction of the SSP. This social movement attracted the environmentalists and human rights 
activists from all over the country and abroad as well. They also became part of non-violent protests 
against the SSP in India. These protests gained international attention as the stories of human rights 
and environmental violations achieved global notoriety, criticism also shifted to the World Bank. 
Pressure mounted, and the World Bank had to withdraw from the funding of the SSP project in 
1993 (ibid). 
Withdrawal of Bank support could not slow down the construction of the SSP, as the national and 
state governments gathered resources to continue work on the SSP. But increasing demands by 
affected communities and the NBA to stop the construction of the SSP remained successful in 1995, 
when the Supreme Court of India ordered to halt the construction of the SSP. In 1999, despite all the 
opposition of the SSP project by NBA, the Supreme Court of India allowed the further construction 
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on the SSP. The Court issued an opinion on the future of the dam on October 18, 2000, and 
immediately approved an increase in the dam height and also gave directions to the state 
governments of Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra and Gujarat that before the beginning of further 
construction, they had to ensure that all those displaced people by the raise in height of 5 meters of 
the SSP, had already been satisfactorily rehabilitated, and also that suitable vacant land for 
rehabilitating them was already in the possession of the respective States (Smita, 2008). 
We can observe from the case study of the SSP that at one point of time, despite all the opposition 
and protests from the affected communities, the Indian government managed to get the support from 
other involved state governments for the implementation of the SSP. The Indian government and 
other involved state governments collectively gathered their own resources after the withdrawal of 
World Bank from the financial support of the project in 1993. This is a striking contrast to the KBD 
project where all the involved provincial governments never came to an agreement on the 
construction of the project. Because, there is a history of hostility among the stakeholders of the 
KBD conflict on the other issue as well as they have been involved in disputes over the distribution 
of other resources like the NFC Awards. Moreover, there was a continuous power struggle to get 
more autonomy among federal government and different provincial governments during different 
time periods
13
. Hence, all these problems have contributed to the disagreement over the KBD 
project. 
5. Concluding Discussion 
I will start this discussion by verifying that what happened in the KBD case was actually the same 
phenomenon described by Swain (2004). He argued that difference in the perceptions of different 
stakeholders is the reason for the emergence of conflict over water resources. He also described that 
water resources can trigger conflicts between the state and its internal groups. The development of 
water resources by any state by building different kinds of infrastructure like dams, irrigation canals 
might be perceived by the local population against their interests. As a result, regional powers in 
that particular area (where new water resources are supposed to be built) may be activated and start 
challenging the actions of the state. I find this theory relevant to understand the KBD conflict as the 
federal government of Pakistan announced the development of the KBD project to meet the growing 
needs of water and electricity, the provincial governments of different smaller provinces considered 
the construction of dam against their interests. The provincial governments of Sindh and KPK 
                                                          
13
Detail has been provided under section 1.2 of the study 
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thought that the provincial government of Punjab would get more share of water from the KBD 
project as they had an earlier perception that Punjab government was taking more water from the 
Tarbela and the Mangla dam (Water Accord 1991). Moreover, the provincial government of the 
KPK province also claimed that a vast piece of their fertile land would be submerged and they 
would also be displaced by the construction of the KBD project so they thought that this project was 
against their interests. 
To sum up, no doubt there is an incompatibility among the interests of stakeholders of the KBD 
project but I think this is not the only reason for the intensified conflict. Lack of trust and exchange 
of harsh words by the stakeholders during the communication process have added a specific aspect 
to the conflict situation by escalating it further as described by Hallgren (2003). He explained in his 
theory that conflict is not only an outcome of opposing interests but that social interaction is the 
major factor. Conflict is a social interaction during which the actors trust in the interaction is 
decreasing. Actors misinterpret or misperceive each other’s actions or intentions. The actors might 
start to think that the others’ intentions would prevent them from getting what they want. Their 
subsequent actions are based on these misunderstandings and in a result trust level starts to decrease 
among stakeholders.  
In the case of the KBD conflict, it has been explained in the study that the purpose of the 
construction of the KBD project has been misinterpreted by the different political leaders of smaller 
provinces. They regarded the dam as the conspiracy by the government of Punjab. They claimed 
that the purpose of the dam was just to facilitate the people of Punjab at the cost of their people. 
Afterwards, very strong and harsh words have been exchanged by stakeholders. One of the 
ministers of the federal government stated that dam would be constructed at all costs as it would 
provide water and generate electricity for all the stakeholders. From these words, regional political 
parties of smaller provinces got the impression that the federal government would construct the 
dam, no matter if they would suffer or not. Their grievances would not be addressed properly. In a 
subsequent action and thinking that the intentions of the federal government would restrict their 
desires (as described by Hallgren), political leaders of smaller provinces used very harsh words to 
express their needs. For example one of the political leaders claimed that Pakistan and the KBD 
cannot co-exist and the other stated that he would be happy to sacrifice his life to stop the 
construction of the KBD project (see Section 3.7). From these statements it can be observed that 
actors misperceived and misinterpreted the actions of each other and it has decreased their trust to 
the interaction. Moreover, it added a specific aspect to the conflict situation and escalated it further. 
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According to the theory outlined above, the signs of distrust in the situation are that the actors make 
attempts to change the situation. Some of the methods to change the situation are to increase their 
own influence on the situation and decrease the influence of others with the use of violence, 
questioning the other’s credibility, and legitimacy. These methods also intensify the already existing 
conflict (Hallgren & Ljung 2005). In the KBD conflict situation we can find these examples. It has 
been explained under section 3.7 of the study that the activists of different regional political parties 
were charged by police and were beaten up when they were launching a protest against the KBD 
project. This action depicts the use of physical violence in order to change the situation. Moreover, 
the federal government has not presented the KBD case in front of ICC which is the main institute 
to settle center-province or inter-provincial disputes in the country. This intention of the federal 
government could also be seen as a way to control the situation and use it in its favor. Furthermore, 
WAPDA has been challenging the authority and legitimacy of IRSA in managing water allocation 
to provinces and refused to pay hydro power generation tax to IRSA (see section 5.4). This action 
could be observed as a clear sign of distrust among stakeholders where they challenge the credibility 
of each other. All these methods to change the situation have considerably contributed to the 
procrastinating of the KBD project and increased the conflict situation. Hence the actors trust in the 
interaction has been decreased and conflict has increased further. 
Water has vital importance in all aspects of human life. Demand of water and electricity is on the 
rise in Pakistan. To accommodate the demand, several federal governments have emphasized the 
need to move forward with the KBD project in the country. As the study describes, this project has 
been lingering on for decades due to different controversies between the federal government and 
provincial governments from time to time. There is a considerable resistance against this project in 
the smaller provinces of the country. This difference of opinion is mounting distrust between federal 
and provincial governments. Due to the controversy over the decades regarding the KBD project, it 
was considered important to observe the relations between the federal government and provincial 
governments on the matters of ethnicity, provincial autonomy and NFC Awards. The purpose of 
study  their relationships was to get a broad and clear picture of the whole controversy surrounding 
the KBD project and to see if there were some other matters that contributed to the controversy of 
the KBD project. 
It has been found in the study that all the provinces had been caught up in different disputes with the 
federal governments during different time periods. The construction of reservoirs like the Mangla 
and Tarbela dams engendered the dispute over the allocation of water share among the provincial 
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governments of Punjab, Sindh and KPK. These provinces were the main users of the irrigation 
water from these dams. The government of Sindh province accused the provincial government of 
Punjab for stealing its water share from these reservoirs. But the provincial government of Punjab 
refused the allegations and claimed that it has been using less water than its requirement to 
accommodate the provincial government of Sindh and KPK. The development of new water 
reservoirs in the country was almost stopped in 1977 due to the non-resolution of already existing 
disputes. The country faced a one and a half decade long crisis related to irrigation supplies and 
hydropower generation before reaching a consensus in the 1991 Water Distribution Accord. 
Moreover, the provinces and the federal government have been involved in conflict since the 
beginning of NFC awards in 1973, which many times had not been enforced because of the failure 
of consensus among stakeholders. Provincial governments of smaller provinces like KPK and Sindh 
showed their grievances against the distribution formula of NFC awards. Later, these provincial 
governments developed the perception that federal government did not listen to their needs about 
NFC awards so they would not be able to get their rightful share of water from the KBD project. 
Furthermore, the institutes of water dispute management remained totally ineffective to resolve the 
KBD conflict because the decision making process about water disputes is highly centralized. For 
example, despite all the constitutional provisions of CCI, the federal government took the decision 
on its own and did not present the KBD conflict before CCI since last decade. To follow the 
procedure, it should have referred the issue to the CCI. IRSA has also failed to resolve the water 
disputes as it was dragged into power politics on federal and provincial levels. 
In addition to this, the case study of TDP showed that almost 96,000 people were displaced from the 
KPK province during the construction of this dam. Many of the displaced people were not 
compensated properly which created mistrust between displaced people, the provincial government 
of KPK province and the federal government of the country. Most importantly, the constitution of 
the country which was adopted in 1973 had been abrogated many times by different military 
regimes. Military regimes empowered the central government by introducing various constitutional 
amendments and gave fewer powers to provinces. Different political parties were struggling for 
democracy in the country and the provincial governments were struggling for their autonomy at 
same time. 
All of the above disputes were the cause of growing tensions between the provinces and the federal 
government. So, when the KBD project was announced in 1982 among all the other ongoing 
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controversies between the provinces and the federal government, it faced strong opposition from the 
different provinces. The undemocratic governments made it more difficult to manage the KBD 
dispute by creating a gap of interest and miscommunication between small provinces and the federal 
government through ignoring their demand for provincial autonomy. The ethnic and regional 
political parties in the provinces have further politicized the issue. These political parties have been 
opposing the project on the basis of their earlier perceptions that Punjab government would use 
more water after the construction of this project despite the repeated promises from the federal 
government and Punjab government that all the stakeholders would get their rightful share of water 
from the KBD project. Moreover, these political parties are not ready to accept the technical 
feasibility of the project even though it has been confirmed by Pakistan Engineering Congress and 
the technical experts from their own provinces. All these circumstances led toward towards a 
deadlock position and the actors trust to the interaction has considerably decreased. 
Most of all, there is a need to re-build the trust of stakeholders in the interaction and communication 
process. Because when the actors of a common issue have different interests or perspectives but 
have appropriate trust then they can think about things for common interest. There is not a single 
theory or approach that can re-build the trust of actors. It is time consuming process with the 
combination of different approaches. Different meetings and workshops can be arranged to discuss 
common interests. As a way to take practical steps to develop the trust, the federal government must 
address the grievances of smaller provinces especially their concern regarding the displacement of 
the people. And, at the same time, ethno-regional political parties should stop baseless propaganda 
against the project by realizing that the country is already passing through severe electricity crisis. 
In addition to this, there is a need to reactivate the CCI which has been almost inactive since the last 
decade. The functioning of IRSA must be improved and the Water Accord 1991 should be 
implemented in its true spirit. During the implementation of these positive steps, help from 
professional facilitators could also be sought in order to keep the interaction process smooth and in 
right direction. Otherwise, the continuously deteriorating interprovincial relations due to water 
dispute may increase to alarming proportions in the near future, if all the stakeholders are unable to 
reach any consensus on the issue of the KBD project. 
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